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Three visions of managed
competition, 1920-1950
BY RUDOLPH J. R. PERITZ*
I. Introduction: free competition
The phrase "managed competition" has become a commonplace
since the last presidential campaign, particularly with regard to
health care reform. It seems, as well, to be the guiding principle
behind the Clinton administration's approach to trade policy.
Because the FTC and Department of Justice are still in transition,
it is too early to tell how the phrase, the principle, or both, will
migrate into-antitrust policy.
But it is not too early, I believe, to look into the history of
managed competition, to develop a sense of what it has meant in
practical, programmatic terms. It is not a new policy approach. On
the contrary, the idea of managed competition is as old as its
counterpart-"free competition."
I begin this article by asking a few questions about free com-
petition as a way of developing a working model of managed
competition. These questions have emerged from my historical
* Professor of Law, New York Law School.
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research into American competition policy since the Sherman Act
debates. With my working model as a framework, I present the
three dominant visions of managed competition that inspired
Congress and enforcement agencies in the United States between
1920 and 1950. (In a departure from most studies of antitrust and
competition policy, this article will ignore Court doctrine.)
Free competition. From what tyranny do we want to free com-
petition? From the political power of government? Or from the
economic power of dominant firms and cartels? If, for example,
efficiency is our goal and if we believe that competition free of
government management produces and distributes capital, goods,
and services most efficiently, then even predatory pricing or price-
fixing cartels do not justify government intervention. If, however,
we believe that efficiency is threatened by dominant finns or car-
tels, then political oversight is mandated. And for those of us who
distrust all discretionary power, whether political or economic,
can we formulate policy that limits both public and private man-
agement of competition?
The history of competition policy in America can be under-
stood as a series of approaches to resolve this tension embodied in
the idea of "free competition." None of these approaches has dis-
appeared into history. Each of them, at least traces of each, remain
part of today's rhetoric of free competition.'
When free competition has meant freedom from government
supervision, when it has meant laissez-faire, commercial markets
have sometimes been competitive but more often, privately man-
aged. Privately managed competition is the result of market power
I For expanded discussions, see RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, AMERICAN
COMPETITION POLICY SINCE 1888: A COUNTER-HISTORY (forthcoming
Oxford University Press) [hereinafter AMERICAN COMPETITION POLICY
SI cE 1888]; Forward: Antitrust as Public Interest Law, in Symposium
Observing the Sherman Act Centennial: The Past and Future of Antitrust
as Public Interest Law, 35 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 767 (1990); A Counter-
History of Antitrust Law, 1984 DuKE LJ. 263; The "Rule of Reason" in
Antitrust Law: Property Logic in Restraint of Competition, 40 HASTINGS
L.J. 285 (1989).
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over rivals or bargaining power over trading partners. That is,
management of either horizontal or vertical competition. Manage-
ment power can rest in the hands of one dominant firm or in a car-
tel. Thus, "free competition" has often produced competition
managed by market participants with some sort of economic
power. The classical arguments for this form of free competition
have descended from liberty of contract, from the freedom to
exercise one's property rights without government interference.
Neoclassical arguments have derived from the belief that unfet-
tered competition is more "efficient," in some sense of the term.2
When free competition has meant freedom from dominant
firms or cartels, when it has meant rivalry amongst numerous
competitors, commercial markets have sometimes been competi-
tive and often, publicly managed. Publicly managed competition
has meant active government enforcement to limit the exercise of
private economic power, either vertical or horizontal. It has taken
many forms, including antitrust rules for competition, tax incen-
tives, and trade policy. The classical arguments for this form of
free competition have stemmed from a deep distrust of economic
power, a strong preference for small business, from the ideology
of Jeffersonian entrepreneurialism. Neoclassical arguments have
derived from the familiar economic model of perfect competition.
2 A good example of the difference between classical and neoclassi-
cal arguments for free competition can be seen in two contrasting formu-
lations of the "rule of reason." In the Standard Oil opinion written by
Chief Justice Edward D. White, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), the "rule of reason"
meant the public policy of competition was best served by protecting pri-
vate rights of contract: The "rule of reason" was intended "to prevent
[the Sherman Act] from destroying all liberty of contract and all substan-
tial right to trade, and thus causing the act to be at war with itself by
annihilating the fundamental right of freedom of contract." Justice Louis
D. Brandeis' restatement of the "rule of reason" in the Chicago Board
decision, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), turned this deductive analysis on its head,
determining inductively the reasonableness of a contract by looking at its
public effects: Does the private agreement "regulate[ ] and thereby pro-
mote[ ] competition or [does it] suppress or even destroy competition?"
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Seen in terms of this preliminary model, free competition and
managed competition can be understood as complementary.3 Each
is the limit of the other. Their dynamic relationship turns on this
question: From what tyranny do you want to free competition?
This simple question has produced complex policy responses over
the last century. The question itself becomes even more difficult
when asked of the last 50 years, in the context of postclassical
economics-Edward Chamberlain's theories of oligopoly and
monopolistic competition, and Joseph Schumpeter's theory of
dynamic competition.4 But, I believe, the basic question remains
the same.
In the body of this article, I present three visions of managed
competition and thus, by implication, three correlative views of
free competition. I place each vision in its historical and eco-
nomic context, between 1920 and 1950, and trace the vision
through the practical antitrust program that followed. From what
tyranny did Congress or the Executive seek to free competition?
What were the practical consequences of each program to manage
competition?
The first vision has come to be associated with Herbert
Hoover and the trade association movement. The second inspired
Franklin Roosevelt's early New Deal, especially the National
Industrial Recovery Act. The third informed a series of statutes
passed later in the New Deal and in the Truman administration.
3 I have described these two views of competition in terms of a con-
flict between liberty and equality. See sources cited in note 1 supra.
4 EDWARD CIAmBI-LAiN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
(1932); JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY
(1942). Schumpeter was quick to point out that Alfred Marshall, the orig-
inal price theorist, recognized the common occurrence of monopoly
power and thus, anticipated the work of Chamberlain. For his earlier and
more circumspect description of economic development as "revolution-
ary" or discontinuous change by entrepreneurs, see JOSEPH A. SCHUM-
PETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEvELoPMENT (1 German language ed.
1911) (R. Opie trans., 1934), particularly his discussion of the "funda-
mental phenomenon of economic development" at 57-94.
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II. First vision: Herbert Hoover and trade associationalism,
1920-19325
A nationwide trade association movement began in the years
immediately preceding the Standard Oil decision (1911). By the
1920s, the era of trade associations was in full bloom. The move-
ment reflected the recent experience of triumph, tempered by
established ideology. The recent experience of national mobiliza-
tion during World War I under Woodrow Wilson's War Industries
Board demonstrated the awesome power of industrial cooperation
under government management. The flush of success was, how-
ever, tempered by the longstanding commitment to individual lib-
erty and a distrust of expansive government, expressed in both the
Standard Oil decision's rule of reason and the earlier Lochner
(1905) decision's 6 economic due process jurisprudence, its
restraint of state regulation based on constitutional principles of
private property and liberty of contract.
Advocates of industrial trade associationalism called for mar-
kets administered by contract, by trade associations, to replace
"destructive competition" among individual rivals. But an ideo-
logical difficulty lay in the inescapable role of government: What
sort of political action to manage markets was consistent with
freedom of contract, with free competition? To an amazing extent,
it was the work of Herbert Hoover, particularly as Secretary of
Commerce under Warren G. Harding beginning in 1920, that
turned the trade association movement into a full-blown vision of
cooperative competition.
Fresh from his success at helping America's European allies
begin their recovery efforts after World War I, Herbert Hoover
was convinced that "the laws of Scientific Management" could
provide the structure for efficient and "socially responsible eco-
5 See Paiprrz, A~mmcN CoI, rrrmoN Poucy SncE 1888, supra note
1, at ch. 2 and sources cited therein.
6 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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nomic institutions and processes." A wide range of policymakers
agreed.
Economist John M. Clark, who would gain notoriety for his
development of the influential theory of "workable competition"
in the 1940s, wrote in 1923 that trade associations enhanced com-
petition when they promoted information exchange amongst
members, thereby avoiding ruinous competition. 7
Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Louis Brandeis
agreed, Holmes writing in dissent (in American Column & Lum-
ber (1921)) that the Sherman Act "did not set itself against knowl-
edge-did not aim at a transitory cheapness unprofitable to the
community as a whole." 8
Muckrakers such as Ida Tarbell urged a "golden rule," "a live
and let live attitude" amongst rivals. Philosopher John Dewey
viewed associationalism as a pragmatic exercise in economic
democracy. The title page of an enormously popular book, enti-
tled The New Competition (1914) by Arthur Jerome Eddy, a
prominent member of Chicago's corporate bar, displays the fol-
lowing phrase, italicized, underlined, within quotation marks, and
in 18-point type: "COMPETITION IS WAR AND WAR IS
HELL."
Woodrow Wilson's War Industries Board of 1917-1918 encour-
aged the formation of trade associations to exchange information
and stabilize markets. The Department of Commerce published a
report estimating that approximately 1000 trade associations were
active in 1920. Under Herbert Hoover's tutelage, first as Secretary
of Commerce and then as President, by 1933, there were over
10,000 active trade associations.
Hoover organized conferences, encouraged the development of
industry standards, and made "house calls" to "sick industries,"
7 JOHN M. CLARK, STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD COSTS
432-35 (1923).
S American Column & Lumber Co. v. U.S., 257 U.S. 377, 412-14
(1921).
Managed competition : 279
including the lumber and coal industries. When the Supreme
Court held in American Column & Lumber (1921) that a hard-
wood trade association violated the antitrust laws, Hoover was
outraged, both at the Supreme Court and at the Department of Jus-
tice for bringing the suit. Hoover instructed his Department of
Commerce to perform the industry organizing activities that trade
associations were no longer permitted to do. At the same time, he
lobbied successfully to have a new chief of the Antitrust Division
who took his view of trade associations. That new chief was
Columbia Law School Dean Harlan F. Stone, who, later appointed
to the Supreme Court, wrote the Maple Flooring (1925) decision,9
which took a more lenient view of trade association activities.
Thus, the trade association movement and Herbert Hoover's
support, though remembered as laissez-faire, involved significant
government management. Hoover developed a nationwide net-
work, a shadow bureaucracy under the Department of Commerce,
to help manage trade association activities. Because there was no
formal government involvement-no enabling legislation and no
formal system of enforcement-Hoover's efforts did not run afoul
of the established ideology of liberty of contract, of free competi-
tion. Only in that limited sense can it be thought of as laissez-
faire.
Hoover and other advocates of trade associationalism envi-
sioned the movement as propelled by the twin engines of scien-
tific management and industrial statesmanship. Government
involvement was seen as limited to the support of scientific man-
agement. Industrial statesmanship would manage destructive com-
petition.
That was the vision of trade associationalism. What were the
practical consequences?
Perhaps the most significant practical consequence was a radi-
cal shift in the individual manager's view of his firm and its rela-
tionship to rivals and trading partners. Trade associations were
9 Maple Flooring Manufacturer's Association v. U.S., 268 U.S. 563
(1925).
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formed and managed long before Herbert Hoover entered the
scene in 1920. Perhaps the most influential management firm of
industrial engineers was Stevenson, Jordan & Harrison. Despite
criminal indictments, consent decrees, and injunctions, the firm
maintained its prominence well into the 1940s. Its management of
trade associations was built upon a three-stage price stabilization
program. First, they developed a uniform method of accounting,
giving rivals the information to compete with restraint. Second, if
knowledge of costs was not enough to stabilize markets, they
would compile, analyze, and disseminate statistics regarding
inventory, shipments, orders, etc. Third, if knowledge of costs and
market activity was not enough, the firm developed "the principle
of an Equitable Sharing of the available volume of business." The
idea was to manage competition, to turn cutthroat into cooperative
competition by teaching association members the economic logic
of controlling output to raise price levels. 10
In short, the vision of managed competition held by Herbert
Hoover, economist John M. Clark, lawyer Arthur Jerome Eddy, a
Supreme Court majority, and many others did not match the prac-
tical theory of industry cooperation that led trade association
members to appreciate the relationship between limiting output
and increasing prices. I do not have the space to discuss here the
many reasons for this mismatch." I conclude by stressing that
trade associations taught members an esprit de corps-a sense that
10 For a brief discussion of the influence of industrial engineering
consulting firms on the trade association movement, see the wonderful
book by GEORGE W. STOCKING & MYRON W. WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND
FREE ENTERPRISE 236-43 (1951).
11 I do not discuss here the many reasons for this mismatch. I only
mention that the economic frameworks for understanding trade associa-
tionalism were a declining classical model of economics and an ascen-
dant neoclassical model, both of which imagined a dichotomous
economic world of either competition or monopoly. Trade association
activity, so long as it was not monopolistic in the limited senses of the
classical and neoclassical models, was seen as competitive. For a detailed
treatment, see PERrrz, A MRicAN COMPETITION POLICY SINcE 1988, supra
note 1, at ch. 2.
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together they could manage competition, that they were compet-
ing not with one another but rather with their customers.
III. Second vision: FDR and the National Industrial
Recovery Act, 1933-193512
Trade associations provided the foundation for Franklin Roo-
sevelt's early vision of managed competition, with a New Deal
twist. The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA) man-
dated industrial codes of "fair competition" to organize American
industry and labor. The statute established both procedural
requirements for the drafting process and substantive principles
for government approval. Many codes would include explicit
price-fixing provisions, as did some trade association bylaws
under Harding, Coolidge and Hoover.
The legislative hearings preceding enactment of the NIRA
were filled with the utopian vision of a "co-operative effort by
those engaged in trade and industry." Frightened by the Depres-
sion and its effects on prices, output, and income, everyone
seemed to agree that something on the order of Woodrow Wil-
son's World Industries Board was needed to lead the nation
through an economic emergency.
Three principles illuminated this new vision of managed com-
petition, and distinguished it from its predecessor.
First, the process of code drafting would include not only
industry members but also consumers and labor. This principle of
inclusion stemmed from an appreciation of the two-dimensional
nature of competition-not only horizontal but also vertical. This
was a simple principle long understood by those involved, includ-
ing trade association managers, but outside the neoclassical model
of competition that informed policymakers.
Second, those participating in code drafting would come to
their tasks based on a political norm of equal representation. That
is, the large corporations would not dominate the boards. Mem-
12 See id. at ch. 3.
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bership would not be proportional to percentage of industry out-
put. Moreover, the statute, while it suspended the antitrust laws,
included a substantive provision prohibiting industrial codes from
discriminating against small businesses.
Third, the government would supervise the code drafting pro-
cess to assure compliance with the statute, and would enforce the
codes of fair competition after approval. This principle would not
only maintain fairness but also provide the federal oversight that
separated the success of Wilson's War Industry Board from the
failure of Hoover's trade association movement.
In sum, the legislative history of the NIRA projects an image
of managed competition onto an organic body politic. It envisions
a cooperative venture with participants whose competitive
instincts were tempered by a national esprit de corps, by a sense
that a unified political will was needed to avoid economic col-
lapse. Whether because New Dealers agreed with Berle and
Means that managers of large corporations were no longer
accountable, or with Edward Chamberlain and Joan Robinson that
the nature of competition had changed,13 or because material con-
ditions in the aftermath of the Versailles Treaty had produced eco-
nomic hardship worldwide, there was, for a moment in American
history, a strong consensus favoring government management of
commercial competition to free it from its destructive spiral, from
the extremes of destructive competition and monopoly.
The National Recovery Administration, it was imagined,
would convene interest groups-producers, distributors, retailers,
consumers, workers-equally represented, supervised by neutral
government representatives, informed by economics experts, to
negotiate fair terms for economic activity, industry by industry,
mimicking the activity of healthy competition.
Whatever we might think of it today, the vision of an organic
body politic climbing Jacob's ladder to economic recovery never
13 ADoLPHE BmRLE & GARDNER MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 4; JOAN ROBINSON,
THE ThEoRY OF IMPERmcT ComPETioN (1932).
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really had a chance. The vision did not inform the practice. First
of all, the Roosevelt administration simply failed to do its part.
There was no bureaucratic infrastructure to support the vision. In
consequence, experienced trade association attorneys were draft-
ing codes of fair competition, which were approved by govern-
ment attorneys barely out of law school. Second, the norm of
representational equality never took hold. Instead, industry boards
and the NRA itself were dominated by powerful industrialists and
trade association representatives. As a result, the code provisions
tended to favor their interests. It was no coincidence that most of
the thousands of code violation complaints were filed against
small businesses. Third, consumer and labor representatives were
excluded from the code drafting process. Because workers were
organized and consumers were not, labor unrest produced waves
of strikes approaching industrial warfare while consumers did not
think of themselves as a class and remained unorganized.
By the time the Supreme Court pulled the plug on the NIRA in
its ALA Schechter Poultry (1935) decision,14 the experiment had
already failed. There was little likelihood that Congress would
have passed new legislation to continue the agency beyond the
1935 sunset provision. The vision of managed competition did not
resemble the practice that followed. The practice that followed
was a grotesque parody of Hoover's trade associationalism-on
one side enforced by a Kafka-esque government bureaucracy and
on the other side, enjoined by most federal judges who had the
opportunity.
IV. Third vision: Congress, consumers, and producers,
1935-195015
Hoover's trade associationalism, both in theory and in prac-
tice, favored producers. Consumers were, at best, an afterthought.
Worker associations, unions, were discouraged, often violently.
14 ALA Schechter Poultry Co. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
is See PEnRTz, AMRIvcAN COMPErITION POLICY SINCE 1988, supra note
1, at ch. 4 and sources cited therein.
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Roosevelt's NIRA vision portrayed producers, consumers, and
workers as parts of an organic body politic whose economic rela-
tionships could be accommodated, negotiated under political
supervision. In practice, there was no supervision and no negotia-
tion. Although most antitrust scholars see them as fundamentally
different, both visions produced practical programs that favored
producers, usually large producers who managed competition
either by dominating industries or by organizing trade associa-
tions.
While most historians also see New Deal legislation after ALA
Schechter Poultry as radically different from the NIRA, most
antitrust scholars think of the Robinson-Patman Act and the
Miller-Tydings Resale Price Maintenance Act as cut from the
same cloth. I disagree with the predominant view amongst
antitrust scholars and policymakers that congressional activity
after 1935 projects a protectionist vision of managed competition.
Between 1935 and 1950, Congress passed five pieces of legis-
lation that I see in series. Historians and antitrust scholars have
not recognized any continuity in them. But I understand them as
five statutes linked by a common vision of managed competition.
I will take a passing glance at the five statutes and then con-
clude my discussion with a few remarks about the statutes and the
vision of managed competition they evoke.
The first piece of legislation in my series is the Public Utilities
Holding Company Act of 1935.16 Though seen today as a securi-
ties statute (and indeed, found amongst the securities acts in the
United States Code, enforced by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), the Act empowered the SEC to investigate,
regulate, and dissolve the huge utility holding companies com-
prising what was called the "Power Trust." The legislative history
is replete with references to the uncontrolled power of minority
shareholders at the tip of the pyramidal holding companies, to the
"spoliation, mismanagement, and faithless stewardship," and to
16 49 Stat. 803, 821, 15 U.S.C. § 79k(b)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 79k(b)(2).
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the plunder of individual shareholders and individual utility cus-
tomers.
In 1936, Congress passed the Robinson-Patman Act, 17 which
strengthened the Clayton Act provision regulating price discrimi-
nation. One of the changes eliminated a separate quantity discount
defense; the result was that quantity discounts were a defense to
price discrimination only if they could be cost-justified-penny-
by-penny. Sponsors claimed that large retailers, Sears, Roebuck
for example, used their economic power to extort quantity dis-
counts in excess of the cost savings attributable to efficiencies
produced by large transactions. In consequence, they argued, local
retailers were charged more, subsidizing the large firms. Con-
sumers who dealt with local retailers (most consumers, it was
claimed) paid higher prices.
In 1937, the Miller-Tydings Resale Price Maintenance Act
essentially delegated to the states the power to make vertical price
fixing legal per se. These "fair trade" statutes, passed by forty-
two state legislatures, allowed manufacturers to set the retail
prices of their goods. Sponsors argued that "fair trade" was neces-
sary to stop discounters from predatory pricing, from using "loss
leaders" to destroy local businesses. Moreover, they invoked an
image of individual entrepreneurs as the backbone of America, as
the political and economic middle class that held the nation
together.'
The Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938 amended the Federal Trade
Commission Act of 1914, adding to section 5(a) the now familiar
17 Act of June 19, 1936, ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526, amending Clayton
Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a)-(f) (1976).
is Act of Aug. 17, 1937, ch. 690, tit. VIII, 50 Stat. 693, amending
Sherman Act § 1 (15 U.S.C. § 1), repealed by the Consumer Goods Pric-
ing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, § 2, 89 Stat. 801. The statute should
be understood in its economic context. Financially powerful frins were
already setting resale prices without threat of antitrust prosecution simply
by distributing goods on consignment. Under both Dr. Miles Medical
Company, 220 U.S. 373 (1911) and General Electric, 272 U.S. 476
(1926), their price fixing was legal per se. The Miller-Tydings Act sim-
ply leveled the playing field.
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words "unfair or deceptive acts or practices." As interpreted by
the Supreme Court, the original section 5(a) language of "unfair
competition" required proof of injury to a competitor. Recom-
mended by the FTC and passed with little debate, the new lan-
guage was intended to "protect the consumer," without regard to
other competitive effects. 19
Finally, there was the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, which
amended the Clayton Act section 7 regulation of corporate merg-
ers. Congress expanded the section's coverage of mergers in two
significant respects: first, mergers by purchase of assets were
brought under the statute; second, not only mergers between com-
petitors, but all mergers were subject to antitrust scrutiny. The
postwar concern about corporate size had numerous antecedents,
including government lawsuits against large corporate suppliers
for price-gouging during the war, the well-known ALCOA opin-
ion, written by Supreme-Court-Justice-for-a-Day Learned Hand,
the prewar study of corporate size and efficiency by the presti-
gious Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC) (finding
that efficiency did not correlate with large-scale production), and
finally, the persuasive power of the enormously influential book
by Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Prop-
erty (1932), describing the historical and economic circumstances
surrounding the separation of ownership and control in large cor-
porations and in consequence, the unaccountability of corporate
management. 20
In this context, the Celler-Kefauver Act can be seen as a com-
promise rather than an attack on bigness: Bigness was not pre-
sumptively beneficial insofar as the influential TNEC study
showed that large-scale did not guarantee efficient production.
19 Act of March 21, 1938, ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111, amending the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1980).
20 Act of December 29, 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125, amending
Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (1980); U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); Tim TEMPORARY NATIONAL Eco-
NOMIC CoMMITE (TNEC), RELATrIv EFniciENCY OF LARGE, MEDMIUM-SIZED,
AND SmALL Busnmss (Monograph No. 13, 1941).
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Moreover, bigness carried with it the economic power to influence
commercial and political dealings. On the other hand, corporate
expansion by internal growth was a mark of commercial success.
The compromise, then, entailed a distinction between internal and
external expansion. Internal growth was tolerable but growth by
merger was not. Acquiring economic power by merger was under-
stood as creating the costs of bigness without its benefits, as buy-
ing it rather than earning it. Under those circumstances, the local
producer and the local merchant were to be given the benefit of
the doubt.
The common vision animating these five statutes was a dou-
bled "public interest"-the Siamese twins of consumer and small
producer, sometimes seen in conflict and other times seen in har-
mony. The bond between consumer and small producer, running
through all of the statutes, was a deep faith in the middle-class
ideology of individualism and an equally deep ambivalence
toward large modem corporations. The ambivalence toward big-
ness was produced by a tension between the desire for the eco-
nomic benefits of large-scale production on the one hand and on
the other, a desire to free competition from domination by huge
corporate bureaucracies with massive accumulations of economic
power. The ambivalence, as well as the deep faith in individual-
ism, were both economic and political, both practical and ideolog-
ical.
V. Conclusion
The phrase "managed competition" can be understood as an
historical archive of visions, as a sequence of answers to a simple
question: From what tyranny do you want to free competition?
The three historical examples I have presented provided three dif-
ferent answers in three different historical and economic contexts.
To the extent that we find ourselves in parallel economic circum-
stances or in similar ideological dilemmas, history can bring to
the surface a political unconscious, a collective memory to inform
our current deliberations about managing competition.

